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1 Introduction
One interesting fact in regards to the U.S. economy is that both the number of rms
and the skill premium showed a rising trend in U.S. manufacturing industries after
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Note that rm size was decreasing while the number
of rms was increasing and that the real wage of low-skilled workers did not show a
declining trend despite the increase in wage inequality.1
A second interesting fact is that the timing of entry deregulation lowering the
xed cost of entry is similar to the timing of the increase in the number of rms
and the skill premium. For example, the so-called "Carter/Reagan deregulation"
was implemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Data indicate that this entry
deregulation has been prevailing in U.S. product markets since the late 1970s: the
index of entry costs in U.S. product markets remarkably decreased from 5.2 to 0.6
during the period 1978-1997 (Ebell and Haefke, 2009).2
Due to these similarities, we should no longer ignore the possible relationship
between the xed cost of entry, the number of rms, and the skill premium. This,
however, poses a theoretical challenge to us because no past research has related
the number of rms to the skill premium. Most of the past research has related
technological change (Berman et al., 1994; Katz and Autor, 1999; Krusell et al., 2000)
or international trade (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999;
Acemoglu, 2003; Zhu and Treer, 2005) to the skill premium. This paper now links
the number of rms to the skill premium.
We formulate a simple general equilibrium model to provide a possible theoretical
explanation for the observed relationship between the number of rms and the skill
premium on the basis of xed cost. By extending a well-known variety model due to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we show that lowering the xed cost in the intermediate
sector increases the variety of inputs used by the nal good. The skill premium then
1The number of rms which is dened by the number of establishments in U.S. manufacturing
industries increased from 358,061 to 373,548 over 1982-1997. The relative wage of high-skilled to
low-skilled workers which is dened by the relative wage of non-production to production workers
in U.S. manufacturing industries also increased from 1.58 to 1.88 over the same period. The size of
a rm which is dened by workers per establishment decreased from 53.37 to 48.40; the real wage of
production workers in U.S. manufacturing industries which is deated by the CPI slightly increased
from 100 (1982=100) to 102.07 over the same period. The source of data is the U.S. Annual Survey
of Manufactures (ASM). Note that the ASM uses census data for the number of establishments, and
this census is conducted at 5-year intervals.
2Ebell and Haefke (2009) calculate the index of entry costs by adding the entry delay (as a fraction
of a year) and the fees (as a fraction of annual per capita GDP) and then converting to months by
multiplying by 12 to obtain a composite entry cost measure. Many papers provide evidence on the
costs of entry. For example, see Djankov et al. (2002).
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rises if we assume variety-skill complementarity. We also show that the size of a
rm decreases and the real wage of low skill does not necessarily decline, which are
compatible with the U.S. observations.
A value-added of this paper is our attempt to link rm numbers to skill premium.
It should be noted, however, that this paper is similar to Mitchell (2005) and Mobius
and Schoenle (2006) in that a rise in skill premium can be accompanied by a fall in
rm/plant size. In those studies, technological change, such as the introduction of
new exible machines, changes the organization of production from mass production
to smaller customized batches, making the size of plants/rms smaller. In our model,
on the other hand, entry deregulation lowers the xed cost of entry, causing a decrease
in rm size as well as an increase in rm numbers. Hence, it is policy changes that can
lead to the fall in rm size in our model, while it is technological change in Mitchell
(2005) and Mobius and Schoenle (2006). Thus another value-added of this paper is
to stress policy changes as an alternative source of changes in rm/plant size.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a two-
sector variety model with xed cost and show that our model can qualitatively explain
the observed facts if we assume variety-skill complementarity. We nally conclude
and mention future research in Section 3.
2 Model
2.1 The Ingredients of the Model
In this paper, we extend the standard one-sector variety model (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977) to a two-sector model. Consider an economy with a nal good sector and an
intermediate goods sector. There are two types of skills: high-skilled and low-skilled
labor. Their endowments are given by H and L, respectively. These skills di¤er in
that the high-skilled labor can handle a variety of tasks but the low-skilled labor
cannot.
The production side is as follows. The nal good sector is perfectly competitive.
It uses a continuum [0; n] of intermediate goods and the high skill, and the technology
3Boeri et al. (2000) and Pissarides (2001) show evidence on regulation and employment size.
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is given by the following constant returns to scale production function:
y =
264
0@ nZ
0
x (j) dj
1A= +H
375
1=
;
where y is the output of nal good and x (j) and H are the inputs of di¤erentiated
intermediate good j and high skill. We assume that  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The
elasticity of substitution between the varieties and high skill is given by  = 1= (1  ).
On the other hand, the di¤erentiated intermediate goods sector is monopolistically
competitive. Firms are symmetric and follow Cournot pricing rules. There is also
free entry and exit. Each variety uses the low skill, and the technology of each variety
is given by the following increasing returns to scale production function:
x (j) =

1
b

max [l (j)  f; 0] ;8j;
where l (j) is the input of low skill to produce each variety j, f is the xed cost in
terms of low skill, and b is the unit low-skill requirement.
The demand side is as follows. A representative consumer has the endowments of
high skill and low skill: H and L. The utility function is given by:
u(c) = c;
where c is the consumption of the nal good. The budget constraint is given by:
pyc = wH H + wL L;
where py is the price of the nal good, wH is the wage for the high skill, and wL is
the wage for the low skill.
The feasibility conditions for high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor are:
H = H;
nZ
0
l (j) dj = L:
Finally, let us assume that a government can control xed cost for rms in the
intermediate goods sector. We note that a decrease in the xed cost may be caused
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by technological progress as well as a policy such as entry deregulation.
2.2 Free Entry and the Skill Premium
First, we derive the free-entry number of rms n in the intermediate sector with the
regulated xed cost at f .4
Given an arbitrary n, each producer of varieties facing the indirect demand by
the nal good sector maximizes the prot p (j)x (j)   wLbx (j)   wL f where p (j)
is the price of intermediate good j. By setting wL = 1 as numeraire and using the
symmetry x (j) = x, the output x (n), price p (n), and prot  (n) of each variety
corresponding to this n can be given by:
x (n) =
"
b
pyn(=) 1
=(1 )
  n=
# 1=
H;8j;
p (n) = p =
b

;8j;
 (n) = (b=)x (n)  bx (n)  f; 8j:
Since the price does not depend on the number of varieties n, the price when the
prot of each variety becomes zero by the free entry and exit is also given by p = b=,
and the zero prot condition px (n)  bx (n)  f = 0 with p = b= gives the output of
each variety, x (n) =
 
f

= [b (1  )]. The equality of labor demand and supply in
the intermediate sector, n

bx (n) + f

= L, gives the free-entry number of rms n:
n =
L (1  )
f
:
As we can see, lowering the xed cost f is accompanied by an increase in the
equilibrium free-entry number of rms n.
Second, we derive the solutions in the nal sector.
Let us solve the maximization problem for the nal good sector by means of the
4In regards to the free-entry number of rms, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is one of the most
notable theoretical studies. They show that there is a tendency toward excess entry from a so-
cial standpoint in homogeneous product markets and that product di¤erentiation can reverse this
tendency.
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following short-cut method. Dene a new good
X =
0@ nZ
0
x (j) dj
1A1=
and its price pX . The prot of the nal good sector now becomes:
py (X
 +H)1=   pXX   wHH:
By solving the cost minimization problem for the good X, we nd that the price
of X is:
pX =
0@ nZ
0
p (j)=( 1) dj
1A( 1)= :
By symmetry p (j) = p, this pX becomes:
pX = n
( 1)=p:
The market clearing condition for the nal good and the rst order conditions
with respect to X and H then give:
wH = p

X
 L
H
1 
;
where pX = n( 1)=p. Since we have normalized wL = 1, the relative wage of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor skill premium is simply given by wH .
Finally, by combining the solutions in the intermediate sector and in the nal
sector, we get the skill premium wH
 
f

corresponding to the regulated xed cost f :
wH
 
f

=
 
n( 1)=p
 L
H
1 
; (1)
where n = L (1  ) = f and p = b=:
2.3 The Control of Fixed Cost, the Number of Firms, and
the Skill Premium
We now see the possible relationship between the number of rms and the skill pre-
mium on the basis of xed cost. From (1) in Section 2-2, we get the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 If the government decreases the xed cost f , then the skill premium wH
decreases if  > 0, remains unchanged if  = 0, and increases if  < 0.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (1) in Section 2-2 with respect to f gives:
dwH
 
f

d f
=
+ or 0 or  z}|{

+z }| { 
n( 1)=p
 1 (  1)2

n 1=p
 L
H
1 
L f 2:
From the above lemma, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the government decreases the xed cost. Then the num-
ber of rms increases. The skill premium, the real wages of high- and low-skilled
workers, and the size of a rm also change as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 E¤ects of entry deregulation:
 Skill Premium wH Real Wage of H Real Wage of L Firm Size
 > 0 # " "" #
 = 0 Unchanged " " #
 < 0 " "" " #
 << 0 " " # #
Notes: """ and "#" refer to an increase and a decrease, respectively. """" refers to
a greater increase than """ in each row.
Sketch of Proof.
1. The signs of a change in wH were proven in Lemma.
2. Since  < 1, the e¤ect of n " is greater than the e¤ect of x #. Thus the marginal
product of high-skilled labor (MPH), that is, wH=py increases.
3. The rate of y " is greater than (equal to/smaller than) the rate of MPH " if  > 0
( = 0/ < 0). This relationship and y = (wH=py) H + (wL=py)L imply that the rate
of change in wL=py is greater than (equal to/smaller than) the rate of wH=py " if
 > 0 ( = 0/ < 0).
4. The size of a rm in the intermediate sector, L=n, decreases due to n ".
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In this proposition, we have shown that lowering the xed cost f for rms in the
intermediate sector increases the variety of inputs n used by the nal good. Then the
skill premium wH rises if  < 0, that is, if the varieties and high skill are complements.5
We have also shown that the size of a rm decreases and the real wage of low skill
does not necessarily decline, which are compatible with U.S. observations. We note
that the decrease in the xed cost is here caused by the control of the government,
though it can also be caused by technological progress.
3 Conclusion and Extensions
We have shown some interesting facts in regards to the number of rms, the skill
premium, and the xed cost in the U.S. after the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the
Carter/Reagan deregulation was implemented. Section 2 has shown that our simple
model can qualitatively explain these U.S. observations if we assume the variety-skill
complementarity. This indicates that the number of rms can be a possible source of
the increased skill premium in the U.S. after the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Of course, several next steps could be taken for future research since this paper is
only the rst step to add an alternative theoretical explanation for the rising inequality
to the literature. First, our simple model cannot capture the cross-sectional fact that
larger employers pay higher wages at a point in time (Brown and Medo¤, 1989).
Thus a next logical step is to extend our model to a model with heterogeneous rms
in order to capture this size-wage relationship in the cross-section.6
Second, we can extend this closed economy model to a two-country model. We
can thus analyze the possible e¤ects of domestic entry policy on the skill premium in
a foreign country through variety trade.
5Here, we dene the case  < 0 ( < 1) as the case in which the varieties and the high skill
are complements as does Kurokawa (forthcoming). In some papers, the number of inputs plays a
related role. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) dene the index of complexity which relates the increased
number of inputs to more complexity in production processes. Kremer (1993) theoretically shows
that higher skill workers will use more complex technologies that incorporate more tasks.
6Holmes and Mitchell (2008) connect the size-skill relationship in the cross-section (where larger
plants employ a larger/smaller fraction of skilled workers) to changes over time in the skill premium.
They demonstrate that if the size-skill relationship is positive, an expansion of markets due to
increased trade can increase the skill premium without technological change.
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